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Abstract
In the U.S. Social Security system, the decision of when to claim Social Security benefits is legally independent
of when the individual chooses to separate from the workforce. But if an individual claims benefits prior to his
“full retirement age” (FRA) while continuing to have labor earnings above a relatively low threshold, his
benefits are reduced via the Social Security Earnings Test. The individual is compensated for this benefit
reduction in the form of higher benefit payments payable from the FRA for the remainder of the beneficiary’s
lifetime. To the extent that the relevant actuarial adjustment is actuarially fair, the Earnings Test simply
represents a re-timing of benefit payments. Nevertheless, many people view the benefit reduction as a tax on
earned income after claiming benefits. We posit that whether the Earnings Test influences work and benefit
claiming patterns will depend on whether people are aware of the benefit enhancements paid in return for
continued work. Using an experimental module of the RAND American Life Panel, we explore how people
perceive the Social Security Earnings Test and examine alternative ways to frame the tradeoff between
reduced benefits in the short run and higher benefits paid later and for life. Our overall finding is that
knowledge of the Earnings Test is uneven, with better educated, higher earning, older individuals showing
somewhat greater knowledge than others. The frames we have tested produce only minor effects on individual
choices of earnings or claiming ages, and the effects are difficult to reconcile with economic theory.
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Framing the Social Security Earnings Test 
 
Jeffrey R. Brown, Arie Kapteyn, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Teryn Mattox 
 
 
 
 Under the Social Security “Earnings Test,” when an individual claims his Social Security 
benefits prior to his Full Retirement Age (currently age 66) and then returns to work, his benefit 
check will be reduced by 50 cents per dollar earned over a relatively low annual dollar threshold. 
Offsets of this sort have been in force since the inception of the US Social Security system 
(DeWitt, 1999), and they are prevalent in US corporate pension plans as well as internationally.1 
In this paper, we first confirm the findings of Liebman and Luttmer (2011, 2012) that many 
people do not realize that this reduction in benefits for people younger than their Full Retirement 
Age is repaid in full later, in the form of higher benefits for life. Then we explore whether 
alternative ways of framing, or describing, the Earnings Test might serve to change peoples’ 
work patterns at older ages.    
 The Social Security Earnings Test has been in place virtually since the system’s 
inception, implemented by those who argued that benefits should be used as income replacement 
vehicle for those too frail to work. Others saw the Test as a tactic to induce older workers to 
leave the job market, thus “mak(ing) way for younger workers.” 2 The “lump of labor” fallacy 
has now been discredited,3 and today’s Social Security system faces deep financial stringencies. 
                                                            
1 For instance, Baker and Benjamin (1999) examine Canada’s Retirement Test; Kirkpatrick (1974) 
examined similar rules across one hundred different countries.  
2DeWitt (1999: np) citing testimony of the Honorable John J. Rhodes, III, in hearings before the House 
Ways & Means Subcommittee on Social Security, 1991. He also stated that “[s]ome have contended that 
the Social Security Earnings Test was initially conceived as a means to ensure that program beneficiaries 
had withdrawn “from gainful employment as a condition of benefit receipt. For wage earners, this 
requirement was and is measured primarily by a test of earnings levels… [the earnings test] is simply the 
administrative form of the principle that one must be retired in order to collect retirement benefits from 
Social Security's old-age insurance program.”  
3 For a discussion see Gruber and Wise (2010). 
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For this reason, a number of researchers have suggested that the U.S. may wish to look for ways 
of encouraging individuals to stay in the work force for longer and to delay claiming Social 
Security benefits (e.g., Shoven and Slavov 2012; Social Security Advisory Board 2008; Butrica, 
Smith, and Steuerle 2006).  Additionally, those seeking to implement feasible Social Security 
reforms might benefit from knowing whether the Earnings Test might reasonably be changed to 
encourage continued work. 
 Numerous prior empirical studies have asked whether and how the Earnings Test in the 
United States influenced retirement patterns, and it has proven to be a complex topic to analyze. 
The Earnings Test has been a moving target, changing in important ways over time (c.f. Myers, 
1954). In the original 1935 legislation, for instance, a retiree’s benefits were to be cut to zero if 
he earned a single dollar. This provision was changed before the first benefit checks were issued, 
however: effective in 1940, claimants were permitted to earn up to $14.99 per month without 
losing benefits, and the earnings threshold was thereafter raised periodically over the years (see 
below). From 1961 onward, the benefit offset rate for earnings was periodically reduced, 
enabling older claimants to earn additional amounts over the threshold without losing all 
benefits. And in 1972, the Delayed Retirement Credit was introduced, which raised benefits for 
workers who deferred retirement beyond their Full Retirement Age.  The actuarial adjustment 
has also changed (see Table 1). 
Table 1 here 
 As a consequence of these rule changes, the Earnings Test today no longer has the same 
economic implications as in the past. Since 2000, the actuarial adjustments have been set so that 
it is not, on average, a tax. This is because benefits are reduced if an early retiree earns more than 
the $14,640 threshold per year, but this reduction in benefits for ages 62-65 is then repaid in the 
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form of higher benefits for life, once the retiree attains the Full Retirement Age. Moreover, this 
additional benefit is at least actuarially fair (and may even be advantageous in an environment of 
low interest rates).4 In 2012, for instance, a beneficiary younger than the Full Retirement Age 
(age 66) loses 50 cents per dollar earned over the threshold, which is later offset by a higher 
benefit paid from age 66 onward. This additional amount will, on average, provide him with the 
same total expected lifetime benefits from Social Security.5 Accordingly, in this sense, the 
Earnings Test is actually not a tax but rather simply a re-timing of the flow of future Social 
Security benefits. 
 Nevertheless, there is widespread misunderstanding about the way the Earnings Test 
rules work.6 In what follows, we seek to evaluate using the American Life Panel whether 
alternative presentations of the Earnings Test and benefit consequences might improve 
participant understanding of how the rules work. We also examine whether alternative fames 
might alter peoples’ anticipated work and earnings plans. In doing so, we address two specific 
questions: (1) How do people currently perceive the Earnings Test and how does this shape their 
current expectations around claiming age and retirement age?, and (2) How do alternative frames 
or presentations about the Earnings Test shape understanding and expected work behavior? In 
doing so, we build on our earlier work where we showed that different ways of presenting Social 
                                                            
4As the Social Security Administration notes on its website (SSA 2012b): “You can get Social Security retirement or 
survivors benefits and work at the same time. But, if you are younger than full retirement age and earn more than 
certain amounts, your benefits will be reduced. It is important to note, though, that these benefit reductions are not 
truly lost. Your benefit will be increased at your full retirement age to account for benefits withheld due to earlier 
earnings.” Munnell and Sass (2012) even argue that the benefit increase is better than actuarially fair in times such 
as the present with very low interest rates; see also Shoven and Slavov (2012).  
5 A higher exempt amount applies only to the year in which someone attains his Full Retirement Age. In 2012, for 
instance the exempt amount for that year only is $38,880 a year and the Earnings Test is 33% per dollar above that 
threshold. See http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/rtea.html  
6 For instance a recent news article described how some people contemplate working post-age 62: “Attorney Jim 
Antoniono, 66, of Greensburg, began collecting Social Security benefits this year at full retirement age. ‘I didn't 
look at it earlier because I knew there was a penalty (loss of benefits) if you continued to work,’ he said. ‘It just 
didn't make sense.’" (Duncan, 2012: np). See also Liebman and Luttmer (2012), and Greenwald et al. (2010a and b).  
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Security benefit flows produced economically meaningful and statistically significant changes in 
outcomes (Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell 2012). 
Our survey confirms that there is widespread misunderstanding of the impact of work on 
Social Security benefits prior to the Full Retirement Age. To the extent that people inaccurately 
perceive the ET as a tax, they may be less likely to keep working after they are eligible for 
reduced benefits, a fact that has implications for their economic well-being at older ages. Yet our 
exploration of different ways to present the Earnings Test shows minor and inconsistent effects 
on both claiming ages and anticipated earnings between 62 and the FRA. Our overall conclusion 
– albeit one that should be further explored via additional research - is that the mechanics of the 
Earnings Test are sufficiently obscure to most people that they are likely to have great difficulty 
deciding what is in their best interest. 
In what follows, we first document what people believe about the Social Security 
Earnings Test and offer some suggestions as to why this topic engenders so much perplexity 
among the public. We also briefly review prior studies of the empirical impact of changes in the 
Earnings Test on retirement behavior, many of which conclude that people act as though benefits 
are cut permanently by working during the period prior to the Full Retirement Age. Next we 
describe our methodology and data which are taken from a survey of respondents to the 
American Life Panel. After asking respondents about their understanding of the Earnings Test 
using a vignette about a hypothetical worker, we explain the Test using several alternative ways 
of presenting the rules. Having previously been asked to select a claiming age and a likely 
pattern of labor earnings, the respondents are then invited to alter these outcomes after the frame 
presentations. After summarizing results, we offer conclusions. 
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1. Perceptions of the Social Security Earnings Test 
  The rules under which workers’ earnings have been “tested” to determine whether they 
are truly retired for the purposes of Social Security benefit receipt have varied a great deal over 
time. Under the original Social Security Act of 1935, all benefits were to be withdrawn if the 
beneficiary earned a single dollar. The rationale was that “one must retire in order to receive a 
retirement benefit because loss of earnings due to retirement is the insured condition” (DeWitt 
1997: np).  In 1940, this was changed to be an effective 100% tax on earnings over a small 
threshold (initially set at $14.99 per month).  The policy was further relaxed beginning in 1939 
when claimants were permitted to keep a portion of their benefits over the threshold (although a 
100% tax still applied above a higher threshold).  Beginning in 1960, the 100% offset was 
changed to no offset up to $1,200/year, 50% benefit reduction rate between $1200 and $1500, 
and full reduction for earnings over that amount. The 100% earnings tax rate was eliminated in 
1972. That was also the year that Congress introduced the Delayed Retirement Credit, which 
boosted benefits by 1% per year for someone who claimed his benefits later than his Full 
Retirement Age. In 1977, a lower ET threshold was applied to those working at ages 62-64, 
compared to those age 65+; that same year, legislation raised the Delayed Retirement Credit to 
3% per year. In 1983 the Earnings Test was eliminated for claimants who worked beyond age 70, 
and the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 abolished the Social Security Earnings 
Test for workers attaining their Full Retirement Age. The Earnings Test for younger 
beneficiaries (prior to the FRA) remains in place (Nuschler and Shelton, 2010).  
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  Probably because there have been so many changes in the Earnings Test rules over time, 
it stands to reason that some (and perhaps many) people would fail to understand how the policy 
works.  For instance, Packard (1990: 8) speculated that:  
“(I)f the benefit adjustment for delaying the receipt of benefits or for losing 
benefits because of the test were actuarially fair … these provisions would offset 
the entire work disincentive effect. Unfortunately, the effects of these provisions 
would be behaviorally significant only if they were fully understood by the 
beneficiary population. Little indication exits that the beneficiary population is 
aware of the potential effects of either provision.” 
 
Biggs (2008:1) argued as follows:  
“Most retirees are unaware of this because the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) and financial advisers fail to inform them of how the earnings test works. 
Retirees need better information—and policymakers should consider whether the 
earnings test makes sense at all… Until very recently, SSA’s own publications on 
the earnings test did not provide details on the benefit adjustment that takes place 
at the full retirement age. As a result, many retirees work less at the very time 
when continued work could benefit them most.” 
 
  Interestingly, several economic studies have found that older Americans’ work and 
earnings patterns have responded to changes in the Earnings Test over time, with varying 
estimates regarding the size of the Test’s disincentive effects on work.7 Nevertheless, most of 
these analyses focus only on the benefit reduction due to earning over the threshold, and they 
have generally ignored the fact that benefits rise later after people attain the Full Retirement 
Age.8  For instance, Friedberg and Webb (2009: 10) propose that “beneficiaries appear to react to 
the earnings test…because the credits are not well understood despite actuarially fair 
adjustments.” Likewise Gelber et al. (2011: np) recognize that the increase in benefits from the 
                                                            
7 A partial list of a very long set of references includes for instance Baker and Benjamin (1999), Behaghel 
and Blau (2010), Benitez-Silva and Heiland (2007, 2008), Burtless and Moffitt (1985), Coile et al. (2002), 
Engelhardt and Kumar. (2009), Friedberg (2000), Friedberg and Webb (2009), Gelber, Damon and Sacks 
(forthcoming), Gruber and Orszag (1999, 2003), Gustman and Steinmeier (2004, 2012), Haider and 
Loughran (2008), Honig and Reimers (1989), Leibman and Luttmer (2012), Leonesio (1990), Michaud 
and Van Soest (2007), Packard (1990), Reimbers and Honig (1993, 1996), Sander (1968), Song (2003),  
and Song and Manchester (2007a and b) among others. 
8 An exception is Michaud and van Soest (2007). 
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FRA for those who were subject to the Earnings Test is “approximately actuarially fair….This is 
probably important, but we largely ignore it.” In other words, many analysts assume that the 
Earnings Test is a disincentive to claim benefits by older individuals contemplating continuing to 
work. 
  Brown and Perron (2011:2) suggested that most respondents are “aware that the earnings 
test can reduce current benefits for workers younger than full retirement age, (but) most 
incorrectly believe that the result is a permanent reduction in benefits.” Liebman and Luttmer 
(2008, 2011) conducted two surveys a year apart to a sample of workers age 60-65: they showed 
that around three-fifths (56% in the earlier and 62% in the later study) of the respondents knew 
that benefits in payment status would be reduced if the individual earned more than a threshold 
amount. Yet only two-fifths of this subsample in the later year was aware that the benefit 
reduction would later be offset by higher benefits, meaning that fewer than one in four overall 
(39% of 62%, or 24%) knew that the Earnings Test actually did not entail a lifetime benefit 
reduction. For those who understood that benefits would later rise, the median anticipated benefit 
increase was 5-6.25% per year of delay up to age 70, versus the actual rate of increase of 6-8%. 
Interestingly, among those at least somewhat aware of the Earnings Test in 2008, the median 
reported level of threshold earnings was quite close to the actual value ($12,000 at age 64, versus 
the actual value of $13,560 in 2008). Overall, however, the authors concluded that “people 
appear to have little awareness of the provision that benefits received after the full-benefit age 
will be increased to roughly compensate for the benefits lost due to the earnings test” (Liebman 
and Luttmer 2008: 19).9 
                                                            
9 They also conducted a field experiment in which a treatment group received information about Social 
Security rule including the earnings test, and a control group which did not receive these data. A year 
later, a follow-up survey was carried out, and few more (28%) of the treatment group receiving additional 
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 One reason that few workers might understand how the Earnings Test works is that it is 
frequently overlooked by financial advisers. For instance, a website offering advice to senior 
citizens (Proseniors.com 2012) accurately states how the Test works, but it is silent on how 
benefits are boosted on reaching the Full Retirement Age: 
What Happens If I Work While Receiving Social Security Benefits? Social 
Security withholds benefits if your earnings exceed a certain level but only if 
you are under your FRA. If you retire in 2010 between the ages of 62 and 
your FRA and earn more than $14,160, your SS benefit is reduced by $1 for 
each $2 earned that exceeds $14,160. 
 
A similar bias is inherent in other advisory websites (e.g. MyRetirementPaycheck.com 2012). 
And even when the benefits adjustment is described, frequently it is presented as a risky gamble 
(Kaplan 2008:38): “the early retirement penalty…incurred by electing to receive Social Security 
retirement benefits before the…full retirement age will be recalculated [at]…that age to reflect 
the loss of benefits…suffered this year.…But that adjustment is small consolation in the current 
year, and its salutary effect is entirely contingent on…future longevity. In brief, the operation of 
the retirement earnings test acts as a major economic disincentive to take Social Security benefits 
and engage in any remunerative activity beyond a very low level until the claimant reaches his or 
her full retirement age.”10 The Social Security’s website (SSA, 2012) does a reasonable job of 
explaining how the Earnings Test is offset by higher benefits at present, but Biggs (2008:1) notes 
that “[u]ntil very recently, SSA’s own publications on the earnings test did not provide details on 
the benefit adjustment that takes place at the full retirement age. As a result, many retirees work 
less at the very time when continued work could benefit them most.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
information were aware of the later benefit enhancement, but the effect was not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (5% or better).  
10 This is similar to the “breakeven” framework for evaluating delayed benefit claiming; Brown, Kapteyn 
and Mitchell (2012) report that such an approach significantly encourages early claiming behavior. 
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  Accordingly, while it is widely believed that people simply do not understand the 
Earnings Test and the subsequent benefit enhancement post-FRA, it remains to be seen what can 
be done about it. In what follows, we first investigate further whether and which kinds of people 
are least well informed about the Social Security Earnings Test. We also seek to evaluate which 
particular sorts of presentations might be most effective in establishing if, indeed, the lack of 
information is widespread, and (b) clarifying that “[t]he key point is that any reduction in 
benefits under the earnings test triggers a subsequent increase in benefits” (Gruber and Orszag 
1999: 9). To this we turn next. 
  
2. Methodology and Data 
   We assess the impact of different ways to frame this decision using an experimental 
module we designed for the RAND American Life Panel (ALP). This is an online panel of U.S. 
households that regularly take surveys over the Internet. If, at the recruiting stage, households 
lack internet access, they are provided laptops or WebTV by RAND.  In this way, the ALP has 
the advantage relative to most other Internet panels not requiring Internet access in the recruiting 
stage.11  
The American Life Panel included around 4,924 active panel members at the time we 
contacted participants age 18 or older to invite them to take our survey. We fielded our module 
in the first quarter of 2012, and 3,736 panel members completed the survey for a response rate of 
76% (see Table 2). We dropped 86 respondents who participated in the pilot before the main 
survey was conducted, 46 respondents who did not complete the module, and one respondent 
who reported an (implausible) income of $400 billion. Depending on the specific analysis, we 
omitted respondents who were age 62+, disabled, not US residents, and who gave an initial claim 
                                                            
11 For more explanation of the ALP see http://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP508-2005-11.html. 
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age over the Full Retirement Age or for whom no estimated benefit could be calculated (mostly 
because they were too young to have a sufficient earnings record). If residents indicated they did 
not believe they would be eligible to receive Social Security benefits either on their own earnings 
record or that of a current, late, or former spouse, they were asked to assume for the purposes of 
the survey that they would receive Social Security benefits equal to the average received by 
people with their average age/education/sex characteristics. 
Table 2 here 
 
Eliciting Knowledge of the Earnings Test 
  To ascertain peoples’ level of knowledge about the Social Security Earnings Test, we 
asked them to first answer a series of questions by means of a vignette about a hypothetical 
worker named Joe (specific wording given below). The idea was to solicit answers to questions 
about the impact of returning to work after claiming benefits.12 For all of the questions, the order 
of the answers was randomized to mitigate the types of framing found in other surveys (Brown et 
al. 2012). If the respondent correctly perceived that benefits would be reduced for someone 
earning $20,000 after claiming at age 62, we then asked the following:   
The Joe Vignette 
12.) Now, suppose that on his 63rd birthday – one year after Joe first stopped working and claimed Social Security 
benefits – Joe goes back to work part-time.  In that year, he earns $20,000.   We now want to ask you some 
questions about how you think Joe’s decision to go back to work might affect his Social Security benefits at 
different ages. Let’s start with the year Joe is age 63 and works part-time for $20,000.  While he is working that 
year, what do you think would happen to his Social Security benefits for that year?   
 
a. His monthly benefits during this year (age 63) would be unchanged.  In other words, Joe would still receive the 
same $1,000 per month that he would have received had he not returned to work. 
b. His monthly benefits during this year (age 63) would be reduced.  In other words, Joe would receive less than the 
$1,000 per month that he would have received had he not returned to work. [RIGHT ANSWER] 
                                                            
12 Brown and Perron (2011) presented a simpler vignette to a sample of around 3,000 persons age 55-66 
either currently receiving or expecting to receive Social Security benefits in the future. They report that 
most (80%) of this age group knew that working and earning $40,000 per year would reduce benefits for 
someone working at age 63, but the majority (60%) believed the reduction would be permanent. 
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c. His monthly benefits during this year (age 63) would be increased.  In other words, Joe would receive more than 
the $1,000 per month that he would have received had he not returned to work. 
  
This leads to a branchpoint. Accordingly if the respondent indicated that answer (a) was correct 
for question 12 (‘unchanged’), we asked: 
 
15) In the last question, you told us that Joe would get the same amount of benefits at age 63 even if he returned to 
work that year. Is there any amount he could earn that year that would reduce his benefits? 
a. Yes, if he earned more than a certain amount, his benefits would be reduced. [RIGHT ANSWER IF BELIEVE 
THRESHHOLD IS HIGHER] 
b. No, Social Security benefits would not be withheld, no matter how much he earned while age 64.  
 
If he responded (a) to question 15 (yes), we next asked: 
 
16) What do you think is the maximum he could earn without having his benefits reduced ? (Give us your best 
guess, even if you don’t know the exact amount) He could earn up to [FILL IN] dollars per year while age 64 
without having Social Security benefits withheld.  If he earned more than that, he would have benefits withheld due 
to returning to work. [RIGHT ANSWER IF BELIEVE THRESHHOLD IS HIGHER THAN $20,000 SHOULD BE 
OVER THAT LIMIT] 
 
If the respondent indicated that answer (b) was correct for question 12 (‘reduced’), then we 
asked: 
 
13)  In the last question, you told us that Joe’s benefits at age 63 would be reduced because he returned to work that 
year.  Is there any amount that Joe could earn during the year that he is 63 without reducing his Social Security 
benefits in that year? 
a.  Yes  [RIGHT ANSWER] 
b. No, the Social Security benefits he will be entitled to for that year will be reduced no matter how much he earned 
that year.  
 
If he responded (a) to question 13 then we asked: 
 
14)  You just told us that there is some amount that a person can earn without reducing the Social Security benefits 
he is entitled to for that year.  What is this amount? (Give us your best guess, even if you don’t know the exact 
amount)  Once he earns more than roughly [FILL IN] dollars per year at age 64, Social Security benefit payments 
will be reduced. [RIGHT ANSWER IS $14,640, ANY ANSWER from $10,000 to $20,000 MARKED AS 
CORRECT.] 
 
Everyone was then asked the following question which sought to get at the issue of whether 
Joe’s benefit would be lower after he stopped working:  
 
17).  Now let’s imagine that at the end of that year, right before his 64th birthday, Joe stops working again and never 
again returns to work.  Let’s consider what happens to Joe’s Social Security benefits at age 64, right after he stopped 
working permanently, as a result of the fact that he went back to work for one year while he was age 63. 
a. His monthly benefits at age 64 would be unchanged.  In other words, Joe would still receive the same $1,000 per 
month that he would have received had he not returned to work.   [RIGHT ANSWER] 
12 
 
b. His monthly benefits at age 64 would be reduced.  In other words, Joe would receive less than the $1,000 per 
month that he would have received had he not returned to work. 
c. His monthly benefits at age 64 would be increased.  In other words, Joe would receive more than the $1,000 per 
month that he would have received had he not returned to work. 
 
Everyone also got the next question, which finally gets directly at whether the respondent knew 
that benefits after the full retirement age would rise due to the Earnings Test:  
 
18).  Now let’s consider what would happen to Joe’s Social Security benefits at age 68, several years after he 
stopped working permanently. We would like to know what you believe would happen to Joe’s benefits as a result 
of the fact that he went back to work for a single year while he was age 63.  Recall that age 68 is older than the 
Social Security full retirement age.  
a. His monthly benefits at age 68 would be unchanged.  In other words, Joe would still receive the same $1,000 per 
month that he would have received had he not returned to work.   
b. His monthly benefits at age 68 would be reduced.  In other words, Joe would receive less than the $1,000 per 
month that he would have received had he not returned to work. 
c. His monthly benefits at age 68 would be increased.  In other words, Joe would receive more than the $1,000 per 
month that he would have received had he not returned to work. [RIGHT ANSWER] 
 
Finally, if the respondent knew that benefits would rise as of the normal retirement age we 
asked:  
 
19. You answered that, as a result of his part-time work while he was age 63, Joe’s Social Security benefit would 
grow to more than $1,000 at age 64 and also at age 68.  We would now like to know how you think the Social 
Security benefit paid while he is age 68 compares to what he received at age 65. Based on what we have told you 
(and remembering that we are assuming there is no inflation and no cost-of-living increases), do you think that the 
Social Security benefit he is paid while age 68 would be: 
a. Less than the benefit paid while he is age 65 
b. The same as the benefit paid while he is age 65 
c. Greater than the benefit paid while he is age 65 [RIGHT ANSWER] 
  
Figure  1 illustrates how the Joe vignette appeared on the respondents’ screens. 
Figure 1 here 
 
The Earnings Test Frames 
So as to gauge respondents’ knowledge by means of the hypothetical “Joe” questions, we 
next present respondents with several different frames that seek to assess how respondents think 
about how the Test affects earnings between the early claiming date and FRA, as well as on 
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benefit amounts after the FRA. So as to be able to measure these effects, we first ask respondents 
age 62 or younger early in the survey what age they expect to claim Social Security benefits. We 
also asked each person what he expected to earn per year between ages 62-70, as follows: 
10) At each of the following ages, about how much do you expect to earn from working each year? If you are not 
sure, enter your best guess. [Don’t include income from any sources other than working, such as investment income, 
Social Security or pension benefits, or alimony. Also exclude income earned outside of the US.] 
 Age 
62 
Age 
63 
Age 
64 
Age 
65 
Age 
66 
Age 
67 
Age 
68 
Age 
69 
Age 
70 
Earnings          
 
After completing the Joe vignette, each respondent is reminded of his answer to the earlier 
claiming question as follows: 
 
20) Now we are going to ask the same question again, with different assumptions. Please read the question carefully. 
At the beginning of this survey, you told us that you expect to claim Social Security benefits at age [INSERT 
CLAIM AGE].  You also told us that you expect to have the following earnings from age 62 through 67.  
 Age 62 Age 63 Age 64 Age 65 Age 66 Age 67 Age 68 Age 69 Age 70 
Earnings 
$20000 $20000 $20000 $20000 $20000 $0 $0 $0 $0 
 
Subsequently, respondents are shown several different frames explaining how the Earnings Test 
works. We describe these consecutively: 
FRAME 1: Assume no Earnings Test 
For purposes of this question, please assume that if you continue to work after claiming Social Security benefits, your benefits 
would not be affected now or in the future. Assuming this, would you change your date of claiming and/or your actual or 
expected earnings between ages 62 and 70?   
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
If the respondent answers ‘Yes’ to this question, he is then shown a screen where he can change 
his answer if desired. Figure 2 shows the screen replaying the respondent’s original answer (and 
the question if the respondent wants to stick to the earlier choice), and a second screen where the 
respondent can make changes as a result of the new information. The claiming age is displayed 
by moving the slider, while earnings can be adjusted by entering new amounts into the table. 
Figure 2 here 
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FRAME 2: Assume it is a tax 
The first part of the question is identical to the previous frame, but then it makes the following assumption about the 
ET. Now assume that if you claimed your Social Security benefits before [INSERT FRA] and earned more than a 
particular amount   in any year before [INSERT FRA], your benefits due to returning to work will be lowered by 50 
cents for each dollar that you earn over this amount.  This is called the “Social Security earnings test.”   Assuming 
this, would you change your date of claiming and/or your actual or expected earnings between ages 62 and 70?   
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
If the respondent answers ‘Yes,’ the same screen as shown in Figure 2A is shown. Figure 2B 
shows screen shots of both the initial question and of the screen where the respondent can change 
her original answer. 
Figure 3 then shows a screen shot where the respondent can change answers; the question 
is as follows:  
FRAME 3: Provide correct information about the ET; verbal only 
The “earnings test” we just described is applied to earnings before age [INSERT FRA].   It is important to note, 
however, that these benefit reductions are not truly lost. Your Social Security benefit is increased as of [INSERT 
FRA] to make up for benefits withheld due to earlier earnings. 
  
Next, respondents are shown one more frame, this time selected at random from five different 
frames, described next.  The screen now displays how benefits rise after the Full Retirement Age.  
For instance, in Figure 4, if the respondent clicks ‘yes,’ he sees a new screen also shown in 
Figure 4.  By moving the slider and by changing the earnings numbers, he can see how benefits 
are affected.   
Figures 3 and 4 here 
Compared to the amounts of money “taxed away” by the ET, the increase in benefits after 
FRA may look small. For this reason we also devise a frame where the increase in benefits is 
presented as a lump sum (Figure 5). Once again, if the respondent says ‘Yes,’ he is shown a 
screen with a slider depicted in Figure 5.   
Figure 5 here 
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Next we combine the previous two frames. Figure 6 shows the effect of the earnings test 
on both the monthly benefits after FRA and also the lump sum equivalent. Once again, if the 
respondent responds that he wishes to change his initial choice, a new screen opens up with a 
slider offering the chance alter the claiming age and/or change earnings levels before the FRA. 
These changes will influence the value of benefits given up before FRA and the effects on 
monthly benefits and the equivalent lump sum after FRA. 
Figure 6 here 
Finally, some respondents are presented with Frames 4d and 4e, which are similar to 4b 
and 4c but they embody different assumptions about the interest rates used to compensate for the 
increase in benefits needed to compensate for the loss of benefits between early and full 
retirement age. The Social Security Administration uses a discount rate of 2.9%, whereas the rate 
that would be required to make the tradeoff actuarially fair depends on the respondent’s claiming 
age/birth year.    
 
3. Results for Joe Vignette 
  Next we use the knowledge questions derived using the Joe vignette to cluster 
respondents in terms of their knowledge of the impact of additional work on benefits both before 
and after the Full Retirement Age. Results in Table 3 confirm that only 51.5% of the respondents 
believe that Social Security benefits would be reduced if Joe earned $20,000 in his 63rd year, 
quite a bit above the actual threshold of $14,640 in 2012. Almost half (48.5%) believed that 
Joe’s benefits would be unchanged or would increase right away. For those who knew that 
benefits would be reduced, 70% stated that Joe could have kept his benefit if he earned less than 
a threshold (which they thought would be $11,500 per year on average, below the actual 
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threshold). Among those who thought that benefits would be unchanged for $20,000 in annual 
earnings, the average threshold amount stated was $25,700, almost double the actual value in 
2012. In other words, among the US population as a whole, most people do not understand that 
there is an earnings test. Those who do overestimate the amount they can earn before losing 
benefits.  
Table 3 here 
We also see from Table 3 that very few understand the additional benefits gleaned from 
work after early claiming. About half the respondents (54%) believed that Joe’s benefits would 
not change after he quit working, and only 40% understood that his benefits would rise after the 
Full Retirement age due to the increased work.  Evidently, the rules in effect since 2009 
providing for actuarially neutral benefit recomputations are not widely understood by the average 
individual in the US population.  
Using the answers to the Joe questions, we next group respondents into “knowledge 
clusters.”  At one end of the spectrum we have the fully informed subset, and at the other, the 
completely uninformed group. We assign respondents to one of three categories: “No 
knowledge”, “Some knowledge” and “Fully informed,” as in Table 4. The approach used for 
Cluster A counts as fully informed any respondent who knows that Joe’s benefits will be cut due 
to additional work, along with those who know there is a threshold but think it is higher than it 
actually is (Group 3). For Cluster B, those who overstate the threshold are not classified as 
having some knowledge but not fully informed. Results from ordered Probit analyses appear in 
Table 5, where the dependent variable indicates to which of the three groups a respondent 
belongs, with higher-value categories indicating more knowledge.  
Tables 4 and 5 here 
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Results from the two different knowledge groupings are qualitatively similar. Not 
surprisingly, respondent knowledge of the ET rules rises with age and education. In other words, 
older respondents, who are closer to retirement age, have more reason to familiarize themselves 
with the rules and indeed they do. We have also found in other contexts (Brown, Kapteyn, and 
Mitchell 2011) that being better educated is correlated with a better understanding of Social 
Security rules. Knowledge is related to benefit levels (PIA is the Primary Insurance Amount, 
which is in turn a function of lifetime earnings) in a non-linear manner, first falling and then 
rising with PIA.  Higher permanent earnings are associated with slightly lower knowledge, 
somewhat surprisingly (the PIA refers to the individual’s Primary Insurance Amount which is 
SSA’s approach to measuring lifetime earnings).  Men and women are equally well (or poorly) 
informed, as the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
 
4. Results for Frames 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of the responses to the various earnings test frames 
on four different outcome variables of interest over the age 62-FRA window: average annual 
earnings, average annual earnings in excess of the threshold, the percent of earnings over the 
threshold, and the average claim age. Our predominant impression from the results is that the 
differences in outcomes across the frames are very minor, certainly compared to standard 
deviations.  The bottom part of the Table summarizes change induced by the various frames 
compared to the baseline. The biggest earnings changes are for Frames 4 and 5. Claim ages vary 
so little that the differences only amount to a couple of days. For Frames 1 and 4 (annuity only) 
we observe an increase in earnings, while the frames showing both earnings and a lump sum (3 
and 5) appear to induce a reduction in earnings.  
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Table 6 here 
Table 7 presents paired t-tests of the null hypothesis that the frames do not prompt any 
changes in earnings or claim age outcomes. To increase power, we now combine the frames that 
are identical except for the interest rate assumption. For most of the frames, we fail to reject the 
null: that is, there is no significant reaction to the different ways of explaining the Earnings Test. 
It is worth briefly discussing the few cases where the null is rejected. First, after we tell 
respondents that the ET is a tax, it is surprising that the percentage of total earnings subject to the 
threshold rises significantly. This appears to be an odd response to a tax increase at first sight, 
but we note that that total earnings actually fall slightly and so do average annual earnings over 
the threshold.  
Table 7 here 
In a number of frames, the claim age increases slightly (and significantly) after the frame 
treatment. It is unclear a priori how claim ages should respond to more knowledge about the 
earnings test, except when respondents believe the earnings test to be a tax. More information 
might induce them to claim later to avoid paying the tax. Yet in the only frame where 
respondents are told the earnings test is a tax, respondents actually claim earlier (.09 year, i.e. 
about a month). Comparing the frame where respondents are told to assume that ET is not a tax 
to all frames combined shows a small and marginally significant effect on average annual 
earnings. Earnings are a bit higher on average in the various frames than when assuming there is 
no tax. Given that so few of the differences are statistically significant, the ones that are may 
very well be the result of chance.  
Our overall impression, in sum, is that the alternative frames have little if any impact on 
respondents’ earnings and claim ages. This outcome is consistent with a story where respondents 
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have a very hard time understanding the Earnings Test and hence also find it difficult to evaluate 
the various frames. 
 
5. Multivariate Analysis 
 To examine the results in more detail, we next run OLS regressions linking our four 
outcome variables of interest to dummies representing the frames (the frame showing annuities 
only is the reference category), quadratics in the PIA and age, and education dummies. The four 
dependent variables are average annual earnings from age 62-FRA, average annual earnings over 
the threshold reported by the respondent, the percent of total earnings over the true threshold, 
and claim age.  Since the differences between frames using distinct interest rate assumptions are 
minor, we combine those frames to increase the number of observations per cell. Results appear 
in Table 8. 
Table 8 here 
 Coefficient estimates in the frames are generally statistically insignificant. In fact, there 
are only three significant effects among eight coefficients, which is just a bit better than chance. 
Moreover, since the average annual earnings variables are transformations of one another, it is 
unclear what the significance levels mean.  For instance, the percent of total earnings subject to 
the true threshold between 62 and FRA is never significant, but the average annual earnings 
greater than the threshold are positively affected when we show respondents the lump sum (and 
not when we show both lump sum and annuity). Also, total average annual earnings between 62 
and FRA are not affected when we only show lump sum and negatively when we show annuity 
and lump sum. We summarize our results as follows:  
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Summary of Results from Multivariate Framing Regressions 
Combination frames 1: 
Annuity 2: LS 3: Annuity & LS 
Av. Annual Earnings Age 62 - FRA Omitted NS NS 
Av. Annual Earnings  > Threshhold 62 -
FRA Omitted NS NS 
% Total Earnings s.t. True Threshold 62 A- 
FRA Omitted NS NS 
Claim Age 
Omitted NS Sig, - 
 
 
6.   Discussion and Conclusions   
A large majority of older Americans relies on Social Security benefits for all or most of 
their retirement income. Nevertheless, a recent study (Moore, 2011, np) noted that “most retirees 
…pass up opportunities for additional lifetime retirement income. Taking Social Security 
benefits when they turned 62, many retirees born in 1943, for example, passed up increases of at 
least 33% in their monthly inflation-adjusted Social Security benefit levels available at full 
retirement age of 66.”  One reason may be that older individuals have a very difficult time 
understanding the key features of life annuities which provide income streams for life (Brown, 
Kapteyn, and Mitchell 2012; Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and Mitchell 2012). 
Moreover, retirees face an additional set of opportunities and constraints imposed by the 
Social Security Earnings Test and subsequent benefit increases that afford older workers an 
opportunity to work even after claiming benefits.  Our research using the ALP, a nationally 
representative internet survey, confirms that many Americans have an inkling that working and 
earning income after claiming Social Security benefits results in lower benefits. Nevertheless, 
very few older persons and even fewer younger workers are aware that the benefit offset is 
“made up” in the form of higher benefits later, after the Full Retirement Age. Our work shows 
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that this shortfall in perception is widespread and not easily addressed by alternative ways of 
presenting the information.  We find very few significant effects of the frames on earnings or 
claim age, and the few significant effects are difficult to interpret. 
An interesting puzzle emerges from our findings, namely why do so many empirical 
studies report that legislated changes in the Social Security Earnings Test seem to have a 
measurable impact on older workers’ labor supply behavior?  One reason may be that, for the 
first 75 years of the Social Security program’s existence, the Test was indeed a tax – it was not 
until 2009 that the Delayed Retirement Credit grew sufficiently large that it became effectively 
actuarially fair. We have documented that only about 40% of the respondents in our sample 
believe that the benefit reduction before the FRA leads to higher benefits later. Additionally,  
many financial advisers think of the Earnings Test as a tax and therefore fail to tell their clients 
that benefit reductions before FRA are given back later in the form of higher benefit streams for 
life. 
One conclusion of our work is that knowledge of the mechanics of the earnings test is 
very limited. In particular, the actuarial adjustment of benefits after the FRA is largely not 
understood by the American workforce. Yet our efforts to find informational frames that can 
help individuals make more informed decisions have proved disappointing. The measured effects 
of the alternative frames are generally small and sometimes counter-intuitive. This may, of 
course, indicate that our frames were too complex for most individuals to grasp. It also suggests 
that, short of changing the Earnings Test itself, there are grounds for improving the general 
information provided about the mechanics of the Earnings Test. 
There are potentially interesting policy implications from our work. For instance it might 
be useful to build up middle-aged and older workers’ knowledge of the Earnings Test, and to 
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explain more clearly that it is, in fact, no longer a tax. To this end, Gruber and Orzag (1999) 
recommended “(a) clear and concise mailing to all 61 year olds in America about how the 
earnings test really works, with simple examples, would remove a substantial amount of the 
misinformation about the functioning of the system. Similarly, beneficiaries whose benefits are 
reduced because of the earnings test should be told how much their subsequent benefits will be 
increased as a result.” Financial advisers and SSA field agents might also benefit from updated 
information about how the Earnings Test works today. And finally, Biggs (2008) has pointed out 
that educating the news media could be beneficial, since inaccurate depictions of the rewards to 
continued work could have a substantial impact on workers’ interest in and incentives to remain 
employed at older ages.  
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Table 1. Key Changes in Earnings Test and Social Security Benefit Recomputation Rules  
 
Year Change  
1935   Entire monthly benefit withdrawn for any work (earnings test threshold of zero).      
1939  Beneficiaries allowed to earn up to $14.99/ month without a reduction in benefit; above 
that threshold, entire amount withdrawn; thresholds raised over time to 1960 with 
somewhat higher earnings permitted those age 75+ (from 1950) and age 72+ (from 
1954). 
1960   Benefit reduction rate of $1 per $2 of earnings above $1,200 a year but below $1,500 
threshold per year ($1 per $1 of earnings above that, i.e. benefit reduction rate of 
100%).Lower and upper thresholds raised over time thereafter. 
1972  Benefit reduction rate $1 per $2 of earnings for earnings above threshold of $2,100 and 
threshold raised in steps thereafter to $3,000 by 1976 (i.e., removal of 100 percent benefit 
reduction rate above higher threshold).  
1972   Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) of 1%/year introduced, raising benefits for workers 
who delay retirement past the Full Retirement Age (FRA). 
1977  Lower earnings test threshold implemented for those age 62–64 than for those 65+. 
Thresholds raised periodically after that.   
1977   DRC raised to 3% per year gradually increasing to 8% per year (from 2009). 
1983   Beneficiaries age 70+ exempted from the earnings test. Benefit reduction rate $1 per $3 
of earnings above the threshold for those at or above the FRA. 
2000  Beneficiaries at or above FRA exempted from the earnings test. Younger persons face 
benefit reductions of $1 for each $2 if younger than the FRA; earnings test eliminated for 
those over FRA. 
 
Source: 
Authors’ adaptation from DeWitt (1999) and SSA (2012a)
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Table 2: Sample Size Adjustments In ALP 
Initial N 3772
Special cases 
Pilot observations dropped 86
Did not finish survey 46
Respondent with $400 billion income 1
Ineligible for SS benefits 
Disability (present or future) 278
Other reason (not eligible earnings, not US 
resident, etc) 165
Did not answer SS eligibility question 6
Dropped from experiments 
Did not answer baseline earnings question even 
though eligible (et10) 71
Age >= 62 (dropped from conjectural questions 
incl. et19 and et20) 808
Initial claimage over FRA (dropped from 
conjectural questions incl. et19 and et20) 897
No FRA recorded 3
Skipped vignette (knowledege) questions 17
Problems with PIA estimate 
No PIA estimate 300
Sample for frame analyses 1094
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Table 3. Responses to Joe Vignette 
 
  
N %
Decreased  1,852 51.5
Unchanged 1,427 39.68
Increased 317 8.82
N %
Yes 1,309 69.93
No 563 30.07
Mean SD
Average amount 11,490 8,126
N %
Yes 895 61.39
No 563 38.61
Mean SD
Average amount 25,735 22,571
N %
Decreased  9.06 9.06
Unchanged 1,917 53.25
Increased 1,357 37.69
N %
Decreased  217 6.01
Unchanged 1,961 54.28
Increased 1,435 39.72
N %
Less than 23 2.56
Same 500 55.74
Greater than 374 41.69
ET17: Now let’s imagine that at the end of that year, right before his 64th birthday, Joe stops working again 
and never again returns to work.Let’s consider what happens to Joe’s Social Security benefits at age 64, 
right after he stopped working permanently, as a result of the fact that he went back to work for one year 
while he was age 63.  
12.  Now, suppose that on his 63rd birthday, Joe goes back to work part‐time and earns $20,000. While he 
is working that year, what do you think would happen to his Social Security benefits for that year? 
IF 12 Decreased: Is there any amount he could earn without losing his benefits?
If 13 Yes: What is the threshold?
15. IF 12 Unchanged:  Is there any amount he could earn that would cause him to lose his benefits?
If 15 Yes: What is the threshold?
ET18.  Now let’s consider what would happen to Joe’s Social Security benefits at age 68, several years after 
he stopped working permanently.  What do you believe would happen to Joe’s benefits as a result of the 
fact that he went back to work for a single year while he was age 63. 
ET19.  would grow to more than $1,000 at age 64 and also at age 68.  We would now like to know how you 
think the Social Security benefit paid while he is age 68 compares to what he received at age 65. Based on 
what we have told you (and remembering that we are assuming there is no inflation  and no cost‐of‐living 
increases), do you think that the Social Security benefit he is paid while age 68 would be:
30 
 
Table 4: Clustering of Respondents by Knowledge of Earnings Test Rules 
 
 
 
 
  
All groups Clustering A Clustering B Number Percent
Group 1 No knowledge No ET knowledge No ET knowledge 567 16%
Group 2
No change for Joe but 
there is a threshold 
ET knowledge, 
unknown threshold Some ET knowledge 623 17%
Group 3
No change for Joe but 
there is a threshold and it 
is known
ET knowledge, 
known threshold Some ET knowledge 237 7%
Group 4 Increase for Joe  No ET knowledge No ET knowledge 317 9%
Group 5
Decrease for Joe (correct), 
unknown threshold
ET knowledge, 
unknown threshold Some ET knowledge 584 16%
Group 6
Decrease for Joe (correct), 
known threshold
ET knowledge, 
known threshold Some ET knowledge 510 14%
Group 7
Decrease for Joe (correct), 
not a tax, unknown 
threshold
ET knoweldge, 
unknown threshold Some ET knowledge 391 11%
Group 8 Fully Informed
ET knowledge, 
known threshold Fully Informed 367 10%
Total RED 884 884
Total YELLOW 1598 2345
Total GREEN 1114 367
Percent RED 24.6% 24.6%
Percent YELLOW 44.4% 65.2%
Percent GREEN 31.0% 10.2%
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Table 5: Ordered Probits: Coefficients in bold if significant at least at p<.1 
   
 
 
Note: Knowledge Clusters A and B defined in text. 
 
Knowledge Cluster A
Coef. Std. Err. P>z
PIA -0.0007 0.0003 0.02
PIA squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
Age 0.0383 0.0189 0.04
Age squared -0.0002 0.0002 0.28
Education HS grad 0.1466 0.1328 0.27
Education College grad 0.2276 0.1364 0.10
0.0428 0.0494 0.39
N* 2279
LR chi2(7) 119.78
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.02
Log likelihood -2369.93
PIA
Age
Education (<HS grad 
ref)
Female (= 1)
Knowledge Cluster B
Coef. Std. Err. P>z
PIA -0.0009 0.0003 0.00
PIA squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
Age 0.0423 0.0197 0.03
Age squared -0.0003 0.0002 0.20
Education HS grad 0.2142 0.1406 0.13
Education College grad 0.2608 0.1442 0.07
0.0147 0.0518 0.78
N* 2279
LR chi2(7) 90.69
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.02
Log likelihood -1873.93
Education (<HS grad 
ref)
Female (= 1)
PIA
Age
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Table 6. Description of Outcomes by Frame 
 
   
Average annual 
earnings 
Average annual 
earnings > threshold 
% earnings 62‐
FRA s.t. ET (true 
threshold) 
Claimage 
N 
Frame contents 
Frame   Mean    SD    Mean    SD    Mean   SD    Mean    SD   Amount 1  Amount 2 
Frame 0: No 
information, 
not a tax 
 $  27,229    $    72,464    $   20,136    $  70,497   4.8%  0.13388  65.117  2.12569          1,034  The "earnings test" we just 
described is applied to earnings 
before age. It is important to 
note, however, that these 
benefit reductions are not truly 
lost. Your Social Security benefit 
is increased to make up for 
benefits withheld due to earlier 
earnings.  
Frame 1: 
Annuity 
 $  27,861    $    66,922    $   20,784    $  65,036   4.8%  0.152884  65.1123  2.35715             228  Annuity: 
Income 
taken away 
each month 
Annuity: 
Incremental 
monthly income 
you will get 
starting at age 
67 
Frame 2: 
Lump Sum 
(Adjust to 
make equal) 
 $  29,448    $    46,526    $   21,972    $  43,150   4.4%  0.116872  65.3737  2.15041             217  Lump sum: 
PV of that 
amount 
being taken 
away using 
the actual 
trustee 
assumptions 
Lump sum: Say 
it's the same as 
Amount 1 (cheat 
to make this 
consistent with 
messaging about 
actuarial 
fairness) 
Frame 3: 
Annuity & 
Lump sum 
(Adjust on 
LS) 
 $  24,742    $    43,241    $   17,661    $  40,105   5.2%  0.142385  64.9888  2.0403             293  Show both 
monthly 
and lump 
sum 
amounts 
from 1 and 
2 
Show both 
monthly and 
lump sum 
amounts from 1 
and 2 
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Average annual 
earnings 
Average annual 
earnings > threshold 
% earnings 62‐
FRA s.t. ET (true 
threshold) 
Claimage 
N 
Frame contents 
Frame   Mean    SD    Mean    SD    Mean   SD    Mean    SD   Amount 1  Amount 2 
Frame 4: 
Annuity only 
(second 
amount is 
adjusted) 
 $  34,160    $  126,320    $   26,196   ########
 
4.2%  0.132401  65.4183  2.12471             209  Annuity: 
Monthly 
amount 1 
from Frame 
1 
Annuity: Use the 
lump sum 
amount 2 from 
Frame 2, go back 
and change the 
monthly income 
amount 2 so 
monthly amount 
is same 
Frame 5: 
Annuity & 
Lump sum 
(both 
amounts 
adjusted) 
 $  20,771    $    31,877    $   14,246    $  28,195   4.5%  0.119939  64.891  2.2087             211  Monthly 
and LS 
amounts 
from 1' and 
2 
Monthly and LS 
amounts from 1' 
and 2 
Differences: F0 to Frame X       
Frame 1   $           ‐                      ‐      $             ‐                  ‐    0.00%               ‐                ‐               ‐   
Frame 2   $    1,586             0.000    $      1,188         0.000  ‐0.35%     (0.019)       0.261      0.005 
Frame 3   $  (3,119)         (0.000)   $   (3,123)       (0.000) 0.42%        0.017     (0.124)  (0.002) 
Frame 4   $    6,299             0.000    $      5,412         0.000  ‐0.61%     (0.029)       0.306      0.006 
Frame 5   $  (7,090)         (0.000)   $   (6,538)       (0.000) ‐0.27%     (0.014)     (0.221)  (0.004) 
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Table 7. Changes in Earnings and Claim Age by Frame 
 
  
ET20 F0 p(diff)
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA 27,162$          27,190$      0.1703
Average Annual Earnings  > Threshold between 62 and FRA 19,817$          19,832$      0.3203
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA 6.85% 4.81% 0.0008
Claim Age 64.58 64.67 0.0001
F0 Frames p(diff)
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA 27,454$          27,661$      0.0149
Average Annual Earnings  > Threshold between 62 and FRA 20,293$          20,433$      0.0545
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA 4.78% 4.74% 0.7785
Claim Age 65.11 65.17 0.0016
F0 Frames p(diff)
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA 31,051$          31,174$      0.1771
Average Annual Earnings  > Threshold between 62 and FRA 23,686$          23,766$      0.2359
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA 4.45% 4.52% 0.7688
Claim Age 65.22 65.27 0.1284
F0 Frames p(diff)
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA 29,682$          30,041$      0.0963
Average Annual Earnings  > Threshold between 62 and FRA 22,343$          22,508$      0.2412
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA 4.58% 4.56% 0.9701
Claim Age 65.26 65.39 0.0174
F0 Frames p(diff)
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA 22,614$          22,835$      0.1745
Average Annual Earnings  > Threshold between 62 and FRA 15,753$          15,945$      0.2412
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA 5.23% 5.04% 0.4507
Claim Age 64.92 64.95 0.0908
b also note that for all of these, the standard errors for claim age are very low since they only have a few options
ET20 (assume it is a tax) vs F0 (assume not a tax) a, b
a. note that there are a different number of people in F0 eligible for this test than in the frames comparisons, as it is 
paired and we had fewer respondents to ET20 than F0. Tthe F0 numbers are thus slightly different here than in the 
next  test.
b also note that for all of these, the standard errors for age of claiming is very low since they only have a few 
options
F0 (assume not a tax) vs all frames (information) a, b
a note that there is a different number of people in F0 eligible for this test, as it is paired and we had fewer 
respondents to ET20 than F0
a also note that for all of these, the standard errors for claim age are very low since they only have a few options
F0 (assume not a tax) vs annuity frames  a, b 
a there are a couple of outliers in frame 4 accounting for the much higher average earnings
b also note that for all of these, the standard errors for claim age are very low since they only have a few options
F0 (assume not a tax) vs lump sum frames a
a also note that for all of these, the standard errors for claim age are very low since they only have a few options
F0 (assume not a tax) to lump sum + annuity frames  a
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Table 8. Sensitivity of of Earnings and Claim Age Outcomes to Frames (OLS) 
Bold coefficients are significant at least p<.1 
 
 
 
  
  
Coef. Std. Err. t
Combo Frame 2: Lump sum only -1423.95 5917.52 -0.24
Combo Frame 3:  Both -8910.99 4851.71 -1.84
PIA -44.07 26.30 -1.68
PIA squared 0.02 0.01 2.22
Age 1653.86 2332.17 0.71
Age squared -25.09 25.71 -0.98
Education HS grad 7426.90 11378.41 0.65
Education College grad 17834.96 11770.12 1.52
-6153.57 4596.90 -1.34
21975.65 53674.61 0.41
Number of obs 1070
F( 10,   602) 3.69
Prob > F 0.0001
R-squared 0.0304
Adj R-squared 0.0221
Root MSE 70645
Controls PIA
Age
Education (<HS 
ref)
Constant
A. Av. Annual earnings 62 to FRA
Frames Combo Frame 1 
(Annuity only 
ref)
Female
Coef. Std. Err. t
Combo Frame 2: Lump sum only -1382.87 5759.29 -0.24
Combo Frame 3:  Both -8206.37 4721.98 -1.74
PIA -44.43 25.59 -1.74
PIA squared 0.02 0.01 2.28
Age 1502.46 2269.81 0.66
Age squared -23.02 25.03 -0.92
Education HS grad 4804.65 11074.16 0.43
Education College grad 14080.95 11455.40 1.23
-5834.62 4473.98 -1.30
20040.93 52239.40 0.38
Number of obs 1070
Censored obs 3.43
Uncensored obs 0.0004
0.0283
Wald chi2(9) 0.0201
Prob > chi2 68756
PIA
B. Av. Annual earnings  > Threshhold 62 to FRA
Frames Combo Frame 1 
(Annuity only 
ref)
Controls
Age
Education (<HS 
ref)
Female
Constant
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Table 8 (cont) 
 
 
 
 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t
Combo Frame 2: Lump sum only 0.00 0.01 0.06
Combo Frame 3:  Both 0.00 0.01 0.27
PIA 0.00 0.00 1.07
PIA squared 0.00 0.00 -0.56
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.37
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.22
Education HS grad -0.04 0.02 -1.97
Education College grad -0.03 0.02 -1.19
-0.01 0.01 -0.60
0.08 0.10 0.80
Number of obs 1070
F( 10,   602) 1.87
Prob > F 0.0531
R-squared 0.0156
Adj R-squared 0.0073
Root MSE 0.13362
C. %  Total Earnings st True ET Threshold 62 to FRA
Frames Combo Frame 1 
(Annuity only 
f)Controls PIA
Age
Education (<HS 
ref)
Female
Constant
Coef. Std. Err. t
Combo Frame 2: Lump sum only 0.12 0.15 0.81
Combo Frame 3:  Both -0.25 0.13 -1.97
PIA 0.00 0.00 0.66
PIA squared 0.00 0.00 -1.04
Age 0.26 0.06 4.33
Age squared 0.00 0.00 -4.89
Education HS grad 0.53 0.30 1.76
Education College grad 0.79 0.31 2.55
0.09 0.12 0.73
59.82 1.34 44.58
Number of obs 1458
F( 10,   602) 10.59
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.0618
Adj R-squared 0.0559
Root MSE 2.1246
Controls PIA
Age
Education (<HS 
ref)
Female
Constant
D. Claim Age
Frames Combo Frame 1 
(Annuity only 
f)
37 
 
Figure 1.   Joe Vignette   
A. Background on Joe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Joe Returns to Work at Age 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
38 
 
C. Knowledge of ET Threshold  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Joe Stops Working Again 
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E. Knowledge of Benefit Recomputation 
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Figure 2. Own Expectations 
A. Assume no Earnings Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
B. Assume 50% Earnings Test 
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Figure 3.    Assume Full Benefit Recomputation (Frame 0 )  
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Figure 4.    Annuity	Only	(Frame	1	)	
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Figure 5. Actuarially Fair Lump Sum (Frame 2) 
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Figure 6. Actuarially Fair Lump	Sum	and	Annuity	(Frame	3)	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
